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Abstract
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the rst part we review
the main results of a typical "New Economic Geography and Growth"
(NEGG) model (Baldwin and Martin, 2003) and assess the contribution
of this literature to the issue of long-run income gaps between countries.
In the second part we discuss the robustness in some results of these
models which are directly linked to important policy implications and we
show that these results crucially depend on very restrictive values of some
parameters of the model. In particular, depending on the di¤erent values
of the degree of love for variety and the elasticity of substitution between
traditional and manufacturing goods, our analytical examples reveal that:
a) when trade is costly enough the symmetric equilibrium might not be
stable also when capital is perfectly mobile; b) the rate of growth might
depend on the geographical allocation of industries also when spillovers are
global and, c) when industrial rms are concentrated in only one region,
countries might not grow at the same rate in real terms.
1 Introduction
Per-capita income gaps across states and even regions of a rich integrated area
such as the EU are sizeable and persistent. As for inequality across regions, one
of the most inuential explanation stems from the idea that regions are highly
specialized, and that productivity may di¤er across sectors. In Kaldors inuen-
tial explanation, trade can drive apart two almost identical regions by causing
industry to agglomerate in one location. This mechanism has been modelled in
several papers on endogenous growth and trade (e.g., Lucas, 1988 and Grossman
and Helpman, 1991). However, papers in this tradition do not take geography
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(i.e. transport costs) into account. More recently, the development of New
Economic Geography literature has extended the Grossman and Helpman ap-
proach to include explicit mechanisms of agglomeration. In this chapter we will
assess the contribution of recent models of agglomeration and economic growth
to Kaldors proposition. In the rst part of the chapter we will explain, compare
and discuss the new approach. In particular, we will then:
 review how the mechanism leading to (catastrophic) agglomeration of the
high-tech sector works and assess the existence of core results across dif-
ferent models;
 explain and discuss what the economic consequences of catastrophic ag-
glomeration are for the core and for the periphery.
In the second part, we will assess the analytical robustness of some important
results which may be appealing for policymakers1 . We will focus on the results
according to which: 1) the symmetric equilibrium is always stable when capital
is perfectly mobile; 2) the geographical allocation of industries does not a¤ect
the growth rate of innovation when spillovers are global; 3) agglomeration can
be growth-enhancing both for the core (where agglomeration takes place) and
for the periphery. These result have strong implications for regional policy and
therefore deserves closer scrutiny. We aim to show that:
 in its current analytical formulation these result are far from robust;
 adopting a more general representation of consumerspreferences results
in a less optimistic outlook on the consequences of agglomeration for the
core and, above all, for the periphery;
The chapter is organized as follows: section 2 analyses the contribution of
some recent developments in New Economic Geography to the issue of long-run
income gaps among countries and the policy implications that can be drawn from
the most important results of the studies in so-called "New economic geography
and growth" (NEGG) literature. Section 3 discusses the robustness of some
these results and shows how their validity is restricted to a very narrow set of
parameters values. Section 4 concludes.
2 NEG, growth and regional gap
Kaldor famously wrote as far as back as 1970:
1The interest UE poses on the NEG literature is well-known. Great part of the working
papers published by the European Investment Bank (the EU nancing institution whose
declared task is to contribute towards the integration, balanced development and economic
and social cohesion of the Member Countries) are written by the leading exponents on the
NEG literature strand.
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When trade is opened up between them, the region with the
more developed industry will be able to supply the need of the agri-
cultural area of the other region on more favourable terms: with
the result that the industrial centre of the second region will lose its
market and will tend to be eliminated. (Kaldor, 1970, p.338)
But what conditions are really needed for this catastrophic agglomeration
to occur? What are the consequences for the economy as a whole and for the
periphery? Is there a case for regional policy? What kind of regional policy?
In the following section, we focus on nding the answer that NEG provides
to these questions. More precisely, our aim is to assess the contribution of NEG
in understanding what the sources and the growth-e¤ect of agglomeration will
be and how much the periphery should worry about agglomeration.
In order to do this, we focus on a typical NEGGmodel. We believe it is useful
to stress some basic assumptions and some already known intermediate results
because they will represent a benchmark for the second part of the chapter in
which we will evaluate to what extent the policy implications of the NEG models
are sensitive to small changes in the assumptions.
Our main references are Baldwin et. al (2004) and Baldwin and Martin
(2003) who have supplied the most important results in this eld. The original
results are contained in Baldwin, Forslid (1999a,1999b and 2000), Martin and
Ottaviano (1999 and 2000), Martin (1998), Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano
(2001) and Bellone and Maupertuis (2003)2
NEGG models can be thought of as the results of the meeting between
two di¤erent strands of literature: new growth theory (Romer 1990, Grossman
and Helpman 1991) and new economic geography (Krugman 1991, Krugman
and Venables 1995). Many of the most popular NEG models focus on labour
and dont take into account the accumulation of physical or knowledge capital.
These models are therefore not suited to explaining the growth process. In
order to ensure that these models are capable of creating sustained growth,
most NEGG models make use of an instrument which is typical of endogenous
growth theory: they add a capital producing sector which makes capital stock
endogenous. The introduction of this sector, which represents the key analytical
di¤erence from the standard CP-models, allows for an analysis 1) of how new
economic activities emerge as a consequence of technological innovations; 2) of
the way these economic activities decide to locate. In other words, by means
of NEGG models, the creation and localisation process of new rms can be
considered as a unique process.
2.1 Model structure and intermediate results
Most existing geography and growth models adopt international settings where
the migration of workers across regions or countries is not allowed for. This is
2Fujita and Thisse (2002) and Yamamoto (2002) belong to the class of GG models as well,
but they adopt a framework which is slightly di¤erent from the one we would like to focus on
in this work.
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because, in the majority of cases, the introduction of workersmigration into
an endogenous growth model under perfect foresight raises di¢ cult problems3 .
Accordingly, we will focus on a framework in which labour is immobile across
regions but a core-periphery outcome is still possible if particular assumptions
are made about capital mobility.
Apart from the introduction of the capital producing sector, the structure
of NEGG models is almost identical to the most popular NEG models. The
world is made of 2 regions, North and South, both endowed with 2 factors:
labour L and capital K: 3 sectors are active in both regions: manufacturing
M; traditional good T and a capital producing sector I: Regions are symmetric
in terms of: preferences, technology, transport costs and labour endowment.
As already stated, labour is assumed to be immobile across regions but mobile
across sectors within the same region.
As in the CP models, the usual Dixit-Stiglitz M -sector (manufactures) con-
sists of di¤erentiated goods but, in this context, xed cost is expressed in terms
of K. Each variety requires one unit of capital which, according to the assump-
tion on capital mobility, can be interpreted as an idea, a new technology, a
patent, or machinery, etc.. Production also entails a variable cost (aM units of
labour per unit of output). Its cost function, therefore, is  + waMxi, where 
is Ks rental rate, w is the wage rate, and xi is total output of a typical rm.
Each regions K is produced by its I-sector which produces one unit of K
with aI unit of labour. So the production and marginal cost function for the
I-sector are, respectively
_K = QK =
LI
aI
(1)
F = waI (2)
Note that this unit of capital in equilibrium is also the xed cost F of the
manufacturing sector. As one unit of capital is required to start a new variety,
the number of varieties and of rms at the world level is simply equal to the
capital stock at the world level: K + K = Kw. We denote n and n as
the number of rms located in the north and south respectively. As one unit
of capital is required per rm we also know that: n + n = Kw. However,
depending on the assumptions we make on capital mobility, the stock of capital
produced and owned by one region may or may not be equal to the number
of rms producing in that region. In the case of capital mobility, the capital
may be produced in one region but the rm that uses this capital unit may be
operating in another region. Hence, when capital is mobile, the number of rms
located in one region is generally di¤erent from the stock of capital owned by
this region.
To individual I-rms, the innovation cost aI is a parameter. However, fol-
lowing Romer (1990), endogenous and sustained growth is provided by assuming
that the marginal cost of producing new capital declines (i.e., aI falls) as the
3See for example Fujita and Thisse (2002) and Baldwin and Forslid (2000) who adopt a
framework allowing for workersmobility.
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sectors cumulative output rises. In the most general form, learning spillovers
are assumed to be localised. The cost of innovation can be expressed as
aI =
1
AKw
where A  sn+ (1  sn) and 0 <  < 1measures the degree of globalization
of learning spillovers. The souths cost function is isomorphic, that is, F  =
w=KwA where A = sn + 1   sn: Notice that, when learning spillovers
are global ( = 1) ; A = A = 1: In the model version we examine, capital
depreciation is ignored4 . Because the number of rms, varieties and capital
units is equal, the growth rate of the number of varieties, on which we focus, is
therefore
g 
_K
K
; g 
_K
K
Finally, traditional goods, which are assumed to be homogenous, are pro-
duced by the T -sector under conditions of perfect competition and constant
returns. By choice of units, one unit of T is made with one unit of L. Basically,
the traditional sector has no "active" role in these models but its existence in
both regions has a crucial role on some of the implications of this class of models.
2.1.1 Consumer choice
The representative consumer is innitely-lived and has the following preferences
Ut =
Z 1
t=0
e t lnQtdt; Qt = C

MC
1 
T ; CM =
"Z K+K
i=0
c
1 1=
i di
# 1
1 1=
(3)
where  is the rate of time preference,  is the constant elasticity of substitution
among varieties, and the other parameters have their customary meaning. As
usual, utility optimization can be thought of as a three-stage decision in which
consumers rst inter-temporally allocate their income between consumption and
savings (according to a logarithmic utility function), then allocate consumption
between manufacturing and traditional goods (according to a Cobb-Douglas
utility function) and nally distribute manufacturing consumption across vari-
eties (according to a CES utility function).
Intertemporal optimization implies that the time path of consumption ex-
penditures E is driven by the standard Euler equation
_E
E
= r   
with the interest rate r satisfying the no-arbitrage-opportunity condition be-
tween investment in the safe asset and capital accumulation
r =

F
+
_F
F
4See Baldwin (2000) and Baldwin et al. (2004) for similar analysis with depreciation
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where  is the rental rate of capital and F its asset value which, due to
perfect competition in the I-sector, is equal to its marginal cost of production.
In the second stage, maximization of the Cobb-Douglas utility function
means that a constant fraction of total northern consumption expenditure E
falls on M -varieties with the rest spent on T:
PMCM = E (4)
pTCT = (1  )E (5)
where pT is the price of the traditional good and PM =
hRK+K
i=0
p1 i di
i 1
1 
is
the Dixit-Stiglitz perfect price index for the manufactured goods.
Finally, in the third stage, the amount of M  goods expenditure E is
allocated across varieties according to the a CES demand function for a typical
M variety cj =
p j
P 1 M
E; where pj is variety js consumer price. Southern
optimization conditions are isomorphic.
2.1.2 Firms choice
Due to perfect competition in the T -sector, the price of the agricultural good
must be equal to the wage of the traditional sectors workers: pT = wT : More-
over, as long as both regions produce some T; the assumption of free trade in
T implies that not only price, but also wages are equalized across regions. It is
therefore convenient to choose home labour as numeraire so that
pT = p

T = wT = w

T = 1
Is it always the case that both regions produce some T? An assumption is
actually needed in order to avoid complete specialization: a single countrys
labour endowment must be insu¢ cient to meet global demand. Formally
L = L < (1  ) (E + E
)
pT
= (1  ) (E + E) (6)
The purpose of making this assumption is to maintain the M -sector wages
xed at the unit value. Since labour is mobile across sector, as long as the T
- sector is present in both regions, a simple arbitrage condition would suggest
that wages of the two sectors cannot di¤er. Hence, M  sector wages are tied
to T -sector wages which, in turn, remain xed at the level of the unit price of
a traditional good. Therefore
wM = w

M = wT = wT = 1 (7)
As we might easily conclude, (7) holds even when the M - sector disappears
in one region. But it does not hold any longer in cases where there is full
specialization. These cases are actually excluded a-priori by (6). However, as
we shall see later, Bellone and Maupertuis (2003) show that by removing this
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assumption, and therefore allowing for complete specialization to occur and for
wages to diverge, has no particular consequences on the divergence-convergence
scenario.
Since wages are uniform e and all varietiesdemand have the same constant
elasticity ; rmsprot maximisation yields local and export prices that are
identical for all varieties no matter where they are produced: p = waM  1 :
Then, imposing the normalization aM =  1 and (7), we nally have
p = w = 1 (8)
As usual, since trade in M is impeded by iceberg import barriers, prices for
markets abroad are higher
p = p;   1
With monopolistic competition, equilibrium operating prot is given by the
value of sales divided by : Due to free entry, this prot is entirely absorbed by
the xed cost of production (the rental rate of capital ): Thus, market clearing
condition for each variety results in
 = B
Ew
Kw
; B =

sE
sn + (1  sn) +
(1  sE)
sn + (1  sn)

(9)
 = B
Ew
Kw
; B =

sE
sn + (1  sn) +
(1  sE)
sn + (1  sn)

(10)
where Ew = E + E is world total expenditure, sE = E=Ew is the north share
of Ew and  = 1  measures the freeness of trade since trade gets freer as 
rises from 0 (prohibitive costs) to 1 (costless trade).
Finally, considering the market clearing condition on M and T goods and
labour market, we conclude that a steady state with constant a growth rate in
the number of varieties (and hence a constant number of R&D workers), will
only exist if Ew is itself constant.
Ew = (2L  LI   LI)

   : (11)
2.2 Does economic growth generate agglomeration?
For the sake of simplicity, we shall answer this question by focusing on the case
when spillovers are global ( = 1): Allowing for localised learning spillovers will
not change the nature of the answer to this question: if capital is immobile and
trade is free enough, an increase in the rate of capital growth in one of the two
regions leads to a Core-Periphery outcome in the high-growth region.
By using a Tobin q approach (Baldwin and Forslid 1999 and 2000), we
know that the equilibrium level of investment (production in the I sector) is
characterized by the equality of the stock market value of a unit of capital
(denoted with the symbol V ) and the replacement cost of capital, F . With
E and E constant in steady state, the Euler equation gives us r = r = :
Moreover, in steady state, the growth rate of the capital stock (or of the number
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of varieties) will be constant and will either be common (g = g in the interior
symmetric case) or norths g (in the core-periphery case)5 . In either case, the
steady-state values of investing in new units of K are
Vt =
t
+ g
;V t =
t
+ g
so that, using (9), (10), (2) and the labour market clearing condition,
q = B(sE ; sn)
Ew
(+ g)
q = B(sE ; sn)
Ew
(+ g)
in equilibrium q = q = 1 therefore, using (11) and the fact that, both in
the symmetric and the CP equilibrium we have B(sE ; sn) = B(sE ; sn) = 1; we
can solve for the equilibrium rate of growth g
g =
2L  (   ) 

(12)
which tells us that the geographical allocation of the I - sector does not
inuence the rate of growth g. As we will see later, this is true only if the cost
of innovation is the same across regions, i.e when learning spillovers are global.
Given that LI > 0 (LI > 0); investment will be positive if and only if q  1
(q  1) : Hence, starting from a symmetric equilibrium when sn = sE = 1=2
and q = q = 1; we can study the linkage between growth and agglomeration of
economic activities by studying the behaviour of q and q as sn varies.
We thus have
@B(sE ; sn)
@sE

sn=1=2
=   @B
(sE ; sn)
@sE

sn=1=2
= 2

1  
1 + 

> 0 (13)
@B(sE ; sn)
@sn

sE ;sn=1=2
=   @B
(sE ; sn)
@sn

sE ;sn=1=2
=  2

1  2
1 + 2

< 0(14)
(14) tells us that a production shifting in the north (i.e. an increase in the
number of rms located in the north) has, by itself, a negative e¤ect: competi-
tion increases, sales and prot go down, the value of the rm becomes smaller
than the replacement cost of capital and there is no more incentive to invest in
the I - sector. The opposite happens in the south.
5The dynamics of the share of manufacturing rms allocated in the north is
_sn = sn (1  sn)
 
_K
K
 
_K
K
!
so that only two kinds of steady state are possible: 1) one in which the rate of growth of
capital is equalized across countries; 2) one in which the manufacturing industries are allocated
and grow in only one region.
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If this were the only mechanism at work, the system would go back to sym-
metry. But (13) suggests that the story does not nish here. In fact, things are
di¤erent if an increase in sn makes sE increase too. In this case, production
shifting (@sn > 0) leads to demand shifting (@sE > 0) and prots in the north
may grow enough to o¤set the negative e¤ect of competition. If so, the typical
north I  sector rm now has the incentive to invest more, so sn increases fur-
ther. The symmetric equilibrium will then become unstable and catastrophic
agglomeration of I and M starts to take place.
So, in order to have catastrophic agglomeration, we need to answer "yes"
to the following crucial questions: 1) does production shifting lead to demand
shifting? 2) does production shifting lead to enough demand shifting? Identi-
fying cases when the answer to both questions is "yes" means recognising the
conditions under which catastrophic agglomeration takes place.
2.2.1 Does production shifting leads to demand shifting?
Given the structure of the model, the only case when the answer to this ques-
tion is "yes" is if we assume capital to be immobile. Analogously to other
NEG models, catastrophic agglomeration is due to a circular causality char-
acterized by both production and demand shifting which reinforce each other.
Production shifting takes the form of capital accumulation in one region (and
de-accumulation in the other) and the demand shifting takes the form of an
increase in permanent income in one region (and a decrease in the other) due to
larger investment. With perfect capital mobility, rms owners can decide where
to locate production and prots are repatriated. Hence a production shifting
does not lead to demand shifting.
By using (14), we can easily infer that, when capital is perfectly mobile, the
symmetric equilibrium will be stable6 . In fact, since with perfect mobility sK
does not change with sn; (production shifting does not a¤ect the distribution
of capital) a small increase in sn will unambiguously lead to a decrease in the
norths prots and an increase in the souths prots, so that rms are induced
to go back in the south. The only active mechanism here is that, when more
rms locate in the north, this increases competition there (and decreases it in
the south).
By contrast, if capital is immobile, then rms cannot choose where to locate
and rm owners are forced to invest in the region where they live (sn = sK).
In this case, gains from capital ownership have to be spent in the region where
production takes place. Hence production shifting results in demand shifting,
i.e., a larger number of rms located in a region means that there will be a
larger share of expenditure in the same region.
This happens because of a simple equilibrium relation between sE and sK .
In equilibrium, when q = q = 1; we have the following:
sE =
E
Ew
=
L+ sK
2L+ 
=
1
2
+

2L+ 

sK   1
2

(15)
6Actually, this is true for each possible initial allocation of rms.
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that is, an increase in the norths share of capital increases its permanent
income and leads therefore to an increase in its share of expenditure. Since with
capital immobility an increase in the norths share of rms corresponds to an
increase in its share of capital (sn = sK), then, following a small increase in sn;
the norths incentives to accumulate are now a¤ected by another mechanism,
that of demand linkages, which works on the opposite direction with respect to
the competition e¤ect (13).
We then need capital immobility to obtain a demand linkage e¤ect from sn
to sE : However, this necessary condition for cumulative causation to take place,
is not su¢ cient.
2.2.2 Does production shifting leads to enough demand shifting?
Di¤erentiating B; we obtain the following
dB(sn; sE) =
@B
@sn
dsn +
@B
@sE
dsE
When capital is immobile and since sn = sK and by (15) dsEdsn =

2L+ > 0 , we
will see that
dB(sn; sE(sn)) =
@B
@sn
dsn +
@B
@sE
dsE
dsn
dsn
In symmetry we have
dB(sn; sE(sn))
dsn

sn=sE=1=2
=   dB
(sn; sE(sn))
dsn

sn=sE=1=2
=  2

1  2
1 + 2

| {z }
market-crowding e¤ect
+2

1  
1 + 


2L+ | {z }
demand-linked e¤ect
Following a small increase in sn; the norths prots increase, and so ag-
glomeration takes place, whenever the market-crowding e¤ect is o¤set by the
demand-linked e¤ect (which is absent in the case of perfect mobility). A quick
examination reveals that this is the case when
 >
L
L+ 
= CP
Hence, catastrophic agglomeration occurs if dsn > 0 when transport costs
are su¢ ciently low. It can be shown that, if the same condition holds, the CP
equilibrium becomes stable.
As usual, both e¤ects decrease as trade becomes freer. But the market-
crowding e¤ect decreases (in absolute value) faster than the demand-linked ef-
fect, so that, when transport costs which are low enough, the latter o¤sets the
former and symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable and CP outcome will be
reached with probability 1:
To sum up, we can so far draw the following conclusions:
 capital immobility is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for economic
integration (raising of ) to generate catastrophic agglomeration. No lo-
calised spillovers of knowledge are required for this result: although the
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cost of innovation is the same everywhere, a higher expenditure share in
the core makes expected prots too low in the periphery.
 When spillovers are global, the the overall growth rate of the economy does
not depend on the geographical allocation of economic activities
 While there is no inequality in the symmetric equilibrium, permanent in-
come levels in the Core are higher than permanent income levels in the
periphery where, by denition, capital just disappears (asimptotically).
However, this di¤erence remains constant in equilibrium. Indeed,
 by terms of trade, the growth rate of real income is the same across regions.
We will come back to this issue later.
2.3 Is agglomeration growth-enhancing?
We are now interested in the growth-e¤ect of agglomeration. As we have al-
ready mentioned, for agglomeration of I andM sectors to be growth-enhancing,
we need to modify some assumption of the model presented above. Although
introducing localized spillovers is not the only way that geography can a¤ect
growth7 , this seems, to some extent, the most natural way8 .
Within these class of models, localized spillovers (LS) means that the cost of
R&D in one region depends only partially ( < 1) on the other regions capital
stock. Hence, innovation costs will also depend both on the stock and the
allocation of overall capital stock. Therefore, taking into account that the wage
rate is equal to 1, (2) becomes
F =
1
AKw
where A  sn +  (1  sn) : The souths expression for innovation costs is iso-
morphic.
From the viewpoint of geographical allocation equililbrium analysis, the main
di¤erences to note are that: 1) the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable for
even higher trade costs (cat < CP ) ; 2) the level of trade costs that causes
symmetric equilibrium to become unstable (cat) no longer coincides with the
level of trade costs where the CP-equilibria becomes stable (CP 0) : In particular
cat < CP 0 < CP and for cat <  < CP two more interior stable equilibria
emerge; 3) both cat and CP are increasing in  so that if we are in a CP
equilibria and  grows enough, the CP equilibrium becomes unstable and the
system might go back to symmetry. A further di¤erence regarding the nature
7Martin and Ottaviano (2001) generate a feedback between growth and agglomeration by
assuming vertical linkages rather than local spillovers in innovation. Because the innovation
sector uses manufacturing goods as an input, the location of manufacturing a¤ects the cost
of innovation through trade costs. Yamamoto (2002) presents a similar model with circular
causation between growth and agglomeration coming from the vertical linkages between the
intermediate goods sector and the innovation sector.
8For an empirical and theoretical support of this assumption see, respectively Moreno, Paci
and Usai (2003) and Duranton and Puga (2002).
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of agglomeration is that while we still observe that a CP outcome (catastrophic
agglomeration of the M sector in only one region) will emerge if and only if
capital is immobile, a full concentration of the I sector may also occur when
capital is perfectly mobile. Due to localized spillovers, in fact, it is less costly
to innovate in the region with the highest number of rms. This implies that,
because of perfect capital mobility, all the innovation will take place in the
region with a higher number of rms. In any case, the other region will be
able to simply buy (without trade costs) innovations or capital produced in the
innovating region.
But, as far as policy rules are concerned, the most signicant di¤erences
concern to the issue of growth: in an LS-world the geographical allocation of
manufacturing rms a¤ects the global growth rate. Using the optimal investment
condition q = q = 1, we nd that, in the symmetric equilibrium (for sn = 1=2)
gS =
(1 + )L  (   ) 

while, in the CP outcome (when sn = 1)
gCP =
2L  (   ) 

The latter is identical to the solution when spillovers are global since, in the CP
outcome, all innovators are located in the same region so that learning is not
a¤ected by the degree of localization . Since  < 1; we have that gCP > gS :
when industry is spread across the two regions, spillovers are minimized, the
cost of innovation is maximum and the global growth rate is minimum.
2.4 The rate of growth of consumption and real income
NEGG models like those presented above are not able to explain di¤erences
in the long-run rate of growth of consumption and real income between core
and peripheral regions: real GDP and consumption growth rate in the two
regions are identical in both the GS and the LS cases. And, most importantly,
real GDP and consumption growth rate is the same in the two regions in the
interior equilibrium (where both are innovating) as well as in the CP equilibria
(where only one is doing so). This is due to the fact that real growth stems from
the constant fall in the price index that is driven by a continuously widening
range of varieties and which is common to the two regions. The price index for
manufactures can be rewritten as
PM = (sn + (1  sn))
1
1  Kw
1
1  (16)
P M = (sn + (1  sn))
1
1  Kw
1
1  (17)
where P M is the price index for the south.
Taking the rate of growth in the steady state, where _sn = 0; we nd that
_PM
PM
=
_P M
P M
=
1
1  
_Kw
Kw
=   g
   1 (18)
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Hence, prices for manufactures decreases at the same rate in both regions,
regardless of the transport costs and the equilibrium allocation of industries.
But the global price level depends also on the price of the traditional good. Since
the latter is our numeraire, the perfect price index associated to the second-stage
Cobb-Douglas utility is then
P = PM ; P
 = P M
which, nally, gives us the following growth rate of prices
_P
P
=
_P 
P 
=   g
   1 (19)
Once again, the growth rate of global prices is the same across regions re-
gardless of both transport costs and the geographical allocation of rms.
Steady state nominal income in the two regions is the sum of labour income
plus prot income and can be written as
Y = L+ sKK
w = L+B(sn; sE)
Ew

Y  = L+  (1  sn)Kw = L+B(sn; sE)E
w

Being sn; sE and Ew constant in steady state, Y and Y  are constant as
well. The common long-run growth rate of real income is therefore
_Y
Y
 
_P
P
=
_Y 
Y 
 
_P 
P 
=
g
   1 (20)
We should stress that, since the long-run growth rate of real income is the
same across countries regardless of the geographical allocation of industries,
countries grow at the same real long-run rate even in CP equilibrium, where
sn = 1: In this case, although long-run nominal incomes di¤er,
Y = L+
Ew

(21)
Y  = L (22)
the long-run growth rate of prices and real income are still represented by
(19) and (20). In other words, while the level of real incomes can di¤er across
regions, the growth rate can only di¤er in the medium term, that is, as the
economy approaches its long-run equilibrium. In the long run, regional real
income growth rates are identical.
As for consumption, we have that in the CP equilibrium both regions displays
the following consumption level
QCP =
E
P
=

L+
Ew

  g

1
P
QCP =
E
P 
=
L
P 
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Where QCP > QCP but
_QCP
QCP
=
_QCP
QCP
= g 1
Why should it be so? Consider the CP equilibrium: although the South
is completely specialized in the traditional sector and does not innovate or in-
deed make any investment of any kind, it experiences the same rate of growth
as the North due to continual terms-of-trade gains. In other words, thanks to
the technological progress in the industrial sector, the price index of the man-
ufacturing goods decreases faster than the price of the agricultural good. This
means that the relative value of the commodity in which the periphery special-
izes agricultural goods  increases overtime making the peripherys imports
of manufacturing goods cheaper. As a result, the real income of the periphery
grows, in the long-run, at the same rate of the core. As we will see later, this
result crucially depends on the particular functional forms chosen to represent
individual preferences.
2.5 Main results and policy implications
We now summarize the main results of the NEGG models, focusing on the
periphery in the CP equilibrium. Results are summarized in the following table
GS K-mob. GS K-imm LS K-mob LS K-imm
Cat. Agglomeration in I - M NO YES YES - NO YES
Static losses for the periphery NO YES NO YES
Dyn. gains for the periphery NO NO YES YES
Dyn. losses for the periphery NO NO NO NO
What we rst notice is that core results are not easy to identify: we have too
many cases which are based on extreme assumptions. These di¢ culties are well
represented by the sharp contrast between the LS case with capital immobility
and the GS case with capital mobility. So how much should a periphery worry
about agglomeration in the other region? Very little if the "true" model is the
one with capital mobility: rst, when spillovers are global, the allocation of
manufacturing industries and knowledge sectors is always stable so that there
is no chance of a CP outcome occuring unless we start from such an initial con-
dition. Second, when spillovers are localized, people should be only too happy
to see their regions R&D sector disappear. With this sector being perfectly
competitive, the periphery does not su¤er any static or dynamic losses after the
agglomeration process of the I sector. By contrast, the concentration of the
entire I sector in the other region, allows for learning spillovers to be exploited
at their maximum degree and, hence, the periphery M - sector and real income
grow at the maximum speed.
If the "true" model is instead the one with capital immobility, the outcomes
are slightly less favourable for the periphery albeit not tragic. When spillovers
are global, the periphery su¤ers from a static loss due to the fact that, since the
M  goods are produced only in the core, the periphery has to face a higher cost
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of living because trade costs are positive and this lowers its long-run permanent
income level with respect to the symmetric equilibrium. On the other hand,
when spillovers are localized, the peripherys worries for the static losses may or
may not be o¤set by the dynamic gains achieved through the higher growth rate
of knowledge. In both cases, the peripheral region will not su¤er any dynamic
losses following the agglomeration of theM and the I sector in the other region.
Hence, a policy-maker that takes NEGG models seriously, can draw two
main messages from these modelsresults:
1. "if you are interested in long-run income of the periphery, do not worry
too much about the agglomeration of the M sector in the core". As we
can see from the table, and as we have analysed before, the periphery
never su¤ers from dynamic losses in the long-run since the rate of growth
of its real income is always equal to the one of the core region. From the
dynamic viewpoint, in a GS world, agglomeration of the M sector in the
core is at most indi¤erent for the periphery. While, in a LS world, it might
also be benecial for the periphery because it allows for the real rate of
growth, which is equal to that of the core, to be maximum.
2. "In a LS-world, be careful with policies aimed at keeping R&D activity
in the periphery, since they could 1) harm the aggregate growth; 2) harm
the periphery"
Both messages seem to imply that regional inequalities might be the price
to pay in order to reach a higher aggregate growth and to maximize long-run
welfare even in the periphery. If these implications turn out to be analytically
robust (and empirically relevant), then the contribution of the NEG to the
understanding of regional problems and policy would be highly valuable. But
are they?
3 Agglomeration and growth revisited
In the following sections we will show that the rather optimistic results of the
NEGG models for the periphery become more pessimistic if the assumptions
we are using are slightly changed. We then discuss the consequences of a slight
variation in two parameters of this class of models: the elasticity of substitution
between manufacturing and traditional goods in the second-stage utility function
and the so-called degree of love for variety. Most (if not all) NEGG models: 1)
make use of Cobb-Douglas (CD) second-stage instant utility function as in (3)
which displays unitary elasticity of substitution between goods of the two kinds
and 2) reduce the dimensionality of the parameter space by linking the marginal
taste for an additional variety (what we call the "love for variety" parameter)
to another crucial parameter: the elasticity of substitution across varieties9 .
9This point is well claried by Benassy (1996). In general, assume that the instantaneous
utility function is U [CT ; CM ] with CM = Vn (c1; ::; cn) homogeneous of degree one. We can
dene a function  (n) that represent the taste for variety and that depicts the utility gain
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This choice allows for a number of results and important simplications. First,
with CD preferences the expenditure shares in the two kinds of goods remain
xed and hence they are not a¤ected by changes in relative prices. A di¤erent
(albeit constant) value of the elasticity of substitution between the two kinds of
goods triggers some important mechanisms which, although not easily tractable,
cannot emerge with unitary elasticity of substitution. Second, the real growth
rate of income and consumption crucially depends on the value of the love for
variety parameter which, in most NEG models10 is xed at v = 1 1 :
It should be stressed here that our intention is not to build a model but
rather to discuss the analitycal source of some important (and optimistic) re-
sults of NEGG models and to provide some examples (not necessarily more
restrictive and in most cases more general) in which such optimistic results for
the periphery are not obtained. To this end, we rst introduce the following
preference structure for a representative consumer
Ut =
Z 1
t=0
e t lnQtdt; Qt =



nw
v+ 1
1 
CM

+ (1  )CT 
 1

; CM =
"Z K+K
i=0
c
1 1=
i di
# 1
1 1=
(23)
  1
The preference structure identied by (23) generalizes (3) in two directions.
First, it considers a CES second-stage instant utility function which. This func-
tional form still displays a constant elasticity of substitution between M and
T goods, yet in this case the elasticity of substitution is equal to 11  which
can be greater or lower than unity (as in the CD case) according to whether
 is respectively negative or positive. Under CES preferences specied here,
the expenditure shares of the nal goods are not xed but depend on the price
index of manufacturing goods.
Second, adopting the same approach as Dixit and Stiglitz (1975), Benassy
(1996) and Smulders and Van de Klundert (2003), the love for variety parameter
v is explicitly considered. In the typical NEGG models it takes the value of 1 1
so that love of variety is intrinsically linked to the elasticity of substitution
across varieties  but in a more general context, as in (23), love of variety need
not to be tied to .
For  = 0 we have a unit value of the elasticity of substitution between
derived from spreading a certain amount of production between n di¤erentiated products
instead of concentrating it on a single variety
 (n) =
Vn (c1; ::; cn)
V1 (nq)
=
Vn (1; ::; 1)
n
Our love for variety parameter is simply the elasticity of 
v (n) =
n0 (n)
 (n)
Its easy to verify that when CM =
R
c
 1

i di
 
 1
we have  (n) = 1
 1 :
10Murata (2004) is an exception in this respect.
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goods M and T and the resulting utility function Qt =

nw
v+ 1
1 
CM

C1 T
is identical to the previous CD case except for the multiplicative term nw
v+ 1
1 
:
For v = 1 1 and  = 0 the utility function collapses to the previous case.
In what follows, we show how some important results of the NEGG models
crucially depend on particular values of these parameters and are not robust to
slight changes. In particular we will show that, according to di¤erent values of
v and ; a) when trade is costly enough the symmetric equilibrium might not be
stable even when capital is perfectly mobile; b) the rate of growth might depend
on the geographical allocation of industries even when spillovers are global; and,
c) in the CP outcome, countries might not grow at the same rate in real terms.
3.1 Intermediate results with CES utility
Taking the T - good as numeraire, second-stage utility maximization leads to
the following demand functions
CM =
E
PM
(nw; PM ) (24)
CT = E (1   (nw; PM )) (25)
where now the expenditure share for manufactures is given by
 (nw; PM ) =
1
1 +

nw
1
 1 vPM
 
1    1 

 1
1 
Notice that (24) and (25) di¤er from (4) and (5) in that the expenditure
shares are not xed. In particular, its easy to see that when  is positive, the
expenditure shares onM - goods tends to increase as the price index of theM 
goods goes down. Substituting the expression for PM with (16) and (17), we
can write
(nw; sn; ) =
1
1 + (nw)
  v1  (sn + (1  sn))

(1 )(1 )
 
1 

 1
1 
(26)
(nw; sn; ) =
1
1 + (nw)
  v1  (sn + (1  sn))

(1 )(1 )
 
1 

 1
1 
(27)
We can make a number of observations from analysing these two expressions.
First, when the elasticity of substitution between the two goods is di¤erent
to 1; (i.e.  6= 0), north and south expenditure shares di¤er ( 6= ) in
correspondence to any geographical allocation of the manufacturing industry
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except for sn = 1=2 (symmetric equilibrium). In particular, we nd that11
 > (<) 0) @
@sn
=
 (1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (   1) ((sn + (1  sn))) > (<) 0 (28)
 > (<) 0) @

@sn
=
 (  1) (1  )
(1  ) (   1) ((sn + (1  sn))) < (>) 0 (29)
Hence, when  > 0, production shifting in the north (@sn > 0) leads to a
relative increase in the southern price index fot the M goods because southern
consumers have to buy a larger fraction of M goods from the north, which
are more expensive because of trade costs. Unlike the CD case, where this
phenomenon had no consequences on the expenditure shares for manufactures
which remained constant across time and space, in the CES case expenditure
shares on M goods are inuenced by the geographical allocation of industries
because they depend on relative prices and relative prices change with sn:
Secondly, we have
 > (<) 0) @
@
=
(1  sn) (1  )
(1  ) (   1) ((sn + (1  sn))) > (<) 0 (30)
 > (<) 0) @

@
=
sn
 (1  )
(1  ) (   1) ((sn + (1  sn))) > (<) 0 (31)
So that, when  > 0; economic integration gives rise to an increase in the ex-
penditure share for manufactured goods in both regions. Obviously, the smaller
the share of manufacturing rms already present in the north (south), the larger
the increase in expenditure share for the M good in the north (south).
Third, and more importantly, by calculations we obtain the following
 > (<) 0) @
@nw
=
v
1  
(1  )
nw
 ( 0)
 > (<) 0) @

@nw
=
v
1  
(1  )
nw
 ( 0)
Therefore, when goods are good substitutes ( > 0), and unless individuals
do not love variety (v > 0) ; the expenditure share for the M  goods is in
both regions an increasing function of the total number of varieties. In the
analytical context of the NEGG models, this result (which is a feature of the
CES utility function we have chosen) has highly unwelcome e¤ects from the
viewpoint of formalizing the dynamics of the model. However, although the
dynamic properties of this model are highly complex, they are not complex
enough to obscure the fact that, when v and  are strictly positive, the two
countries might grow at a di¤erent real growth rate.
Moreover, it is worth noticing that when v = 0; which is simply a "di¤erent"
but "equally restrictive" case with respect to the typical NEGG model12 ,  and
11For simplicitys sake we omit the arguments of the functions  and :
12Murata (2004) uses this utility function to show the relation between agglomeration and
structural change. This assumption can also be found in the new Keynesian economics
literature (see Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987, p.649), for example), which is another strand
of literature based on the model of monopolistic competition by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
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 are both constant in steady state since they are not a¤ected by the increase
in the number of varieties any longer ( @@nw =
@
@nw = 0 when v = 0). Indeed,
by eliminating the love for variety, the expenditure shares are only a¤ected by
the price index through the transport cost ; which is our exogenous parameter,
and through the allocation of industrial activitiy (sn) which is constant along
the balanced growth path.
In what follows, we will focus on three issues whose analysis leads to conclu-
sions which are shown to be highly dependent on the value of the parameters 
and v: In dealing with the rst two issues (the stability properties of the sym-
metric equilibrium and the inuence of geographical allocation in the growth
rate of the technological progress) we will focus on the case where v = 0 and 
may assume any positive value13 between 0 and 1: When looking at the growth
di¤erentials in the real income between the two countries (our third issue), a
positive v is needed in order to obtain a positive growth gap.
3.2 The stability of the symmetric equilibrium when v = 0
The lack of love for variety allows us to focus on how a decline in transportation
costs a¤ects expenditure shares owing to a rise in the real purchasing power.
When v = 0 we nd
(sn; ) =
1
1 + (sn + (1  sn))

(1 )(1 )
 
1 

 1
1 
(32)
(sn; ) =
1
1 + (sn + (1  sn))

(1 )(1 )
 
1 

 1
1 
(33)
By eliminating the love for variety we are able to maintain a version of the
typical assumption in NEGG models which states that a single countrys labour
endowment must be insu¢ cient to meet global demand. We are entitled to do
this because, when v = 0; both  and  cannot reach the unit value. This
assumption should be modied as follows:
L < ([1  (sn; )] sE + [1  (sn; )] (1  sE))Ew; 8 (sn; ) 2 (0; 1)  R2:
(34)
Since sE has to be constant by denition and even
Ew(sE ; sn; ) =
(2L  LI   LI)
sE (   (sn; )) + (1  sE) (   (sn; )) (35)
is constant in steady state, (34) can be accepted without particular loss of
generality.
13The analysis can also be developed for any  2 ( 1; 0) but, for simplicitys sake, we focus
on the case where goods are good susbstitutes which, as suggested by Lucas (1988), appears
to be the most interesting one.
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North and south prots respectively become
 =

sE
sn + (1  sn)(sn; ) +
(1  sE)
sn + (1  sn)
(sn; )

Ew
Kw
(36)
 =

sE
sn + (1  sn)(sn; ) +
(1  sE)
sn + (1  sn)
(sn; )

Ew
Kw
(37)
In the symmetric equilibrium, north and south expenditure shares are given
by
 (sn; )jsn=1=2 =  (sn; )jsn=1=2 =
1
1 +

1+
2
 
(1 )(1 )   1 

 1
1 
(38)
so that world expenditure is given by
Ew(sn; )jsn=1=2 =
(2L  LI   LI)
   ( 12 ; )
(39)
and prots can be written as
 =  =
(2L  g)
Kw
( 12 ; )
   ( 12 ; )
What is the e¤ect of production shifting in the north on prots? From (28)
and (29) we nd that
@(sn)
@sn

sn=sE=1=2
=   @
(sn)
@sn

sn=sE=1=2
= 2
1  
1 + 

(1  ) (   1)

1+
2
 
(1 )(1 )   1 

 1
1 
1 +

1+
2
 
(1 )(1 )   1 

 1
1 
> 0
In words, production shifting leads to a relative increase in the southern price
index of M goods because southern consumers have to buy a larger fraction of
M goods from the north which are more expensive because of trade costs. In
the CD case, this phenomenon has no consequences on expenditure shares for
manufactures which are exogenously xed and remain constant across time and
space. But in the CES case expenditure shares on M goods depend on relative
prices and the latter change with the geographical allocation of industries. By
a sort of home market e¤ect, the decrease in southern demand is more than
compensated for by the increase in northern consumersdemand. This change
in relative demands will have some consequences on relative prots.
Let us start with the case of capital mobility where production shiting
does not lead to a change in the regional allocation of capital (i.e., generally,
sn 6= sK). Therefore, the e¤ect of production shifting in the north on the
relative prots can be written as
@ (=)
@sn

sn=sE=1=2
= 2
(1  )2
(1 + )
2

(1  ) (   1)

1 + 
2
 
(1 )(1 )

1  

 1
1 
| {z }
Price e¤ect
  2(1  )
2
(1 + )
2| {z }
market-crowding e¤ect
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If we compare this expression with (14), we can easily notice that, thanks
to the change in , the negative inuence of the market crowding e¤ect is now
mitigated (and might be o¤set) by a positive e¤ect on prots which was not
present in the CD case. Unlike before, north prots might increase because of
the larger domestic demand of manufacturing goods due to the increase in the
domestic expenditure share  following a reduction in the domestic price index.
This new agglomeration force, which we call price e¤ect, vanishes as trade
becomes freer at a speed which is higher than market-crowding e¤ect.
The price e¤ect o¤sets the market-crowding e¤ect, and hence relative prots
in the north increase after production shifting when
@ (=)
@sn

sn=sE=1=2
> 0 :  < S (; ; ) (40)
where S (; ; ) = 2


(1 )( 1)
 (1 )( 1)
   1 

 1
   1:
This means that the symmetric equilibrium is stable not for any value of ;
but only when  is low enough. In other words, the presence of a new agglomer-
ation force makes for a new possible scenario where symmetric equilibrium may
be unstable even when capital is mobile. But unlike in the case with capital
immobility and CD preferences, the symmetric equilibrium is unstable for low
values of ; that is, when trade is costly enough. This might be considered as
a case of stabilizing integration. When trade is costly, production shifting in
the north will result in a relevant reduction (increase) in north (south) prices
which leads to a relevant increase (reduction) in northern (southern) expendi-
ture shares for the M  goods. In other words, as  is positively inuenced by
sn; northern consumers spend a larger fraction of their income on manufacturing
goods. Northern prots benet from such an increase in the domestic demand
and if trade is costly enough this positive demand e¤ect may o¤set the negative
congestion e¤ect and therefore increase the norths prots. As a consequence,
southern rms have a further incentive to relocate their activities in the north
and, as long as trade remains costly enough, this process leads to the disap-
pearence of the industrial sector in the south and to a perfect concentration of
theM  sector in the north. It is worth highlighting that, being the expenditure
shares xed, this possibility was discarded in the CD case. Obviously, since half
of the rms have southern owners (sn may go to unity, but sK = 1=2); the
south can still enjoy prot gains deriving from the industrial sector. However,
in equilibrium, south consumers enjoy a lower level of utility since their real
income is lower due to higher prices (P  > P ).
But as trade becomes freer, the positive e¤ect of production shifting on the
price index diminishes to the extent that the price e¤ect is not large enough to
compensate for the negative e¤ect of tougher competition. Hence, when trade
is free enough ( < S (; ; )) ; northern prots decrease following production
shifting to the north, southern rms are motivated to move back to the north and
symmetric equilibrium once again becomes stable. According to the di¤erent
values of the parameters ;  and ; three outcomes are possible:
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1. S > 1 so that condition (40) always holds and the symmetric equilibrium
is unstable for any value of :
2. S < 0 so that condition (40) never holds and the symmetric equilibrium
is stable for any value of :
3. 0  S  1 so that the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium
depend on :
We can summarise the case when capital is mobile as follows. Allowing for
the elasticity of substitution to be larger than 1

1
1   1

and assigning a zero
value to the "love for variety" parameter (v = 0), the dynamic properties of the
symmetric equilibrium change substantially with respect to the case when 11  =
1 and v = 1 1 : In particular, when  is low enough ( < S), catastrophic
agglomeration may occur even with perfect capital immobility. Even if the
south maintains the ownership of their rms relocated to the north, southern
consumers enjoy a lower level of steady state utility since they have to a¤ord
higher prices due to the presence of transport costs. In this case, agglomeration
leads to a static loss for consumers which might or might not be compensated
for by the dynamic gain due to the presence of localized spillovers.
When capital is immobile, things are much clearer: the presence of a further
agglomeration force (the price e¤ect) guarantees that the symmetric equilibrium
becomes unstable for even higher values of transport costs (i.e.: lower values of
). This seems to be enough to claim that, with   0; v = 0, and with
capital immobility and  su¢ ciently high, catastrophic agglomeration occurs
with probability 1.
3.3 Growth, integration and the geographical allocation
of industries
Another clear result of NEGG models is that, when knowledge spillovers are not
localized, the growth rate of innovation is not inuenced by the geographical
allocation of rms. In other words, when the cost of innovation is the same
across space, geography does not a¤ect growth. We show that this is not the case
when we allow for the elasticity of substitution to be larger than 1: in this case
geography does matter for growth when spillovers are global. For simplicitys
sake, we still limit the analysis to the case when v = 0:We will focus on the case
when capital is immobile and spillovers are global and calculate and compare
the rate of growth of innovation in the symmetric and CP equilibrium. In the
symmetric equilibrium, Tobins q is equal to 1 for both regions
q = q =
Ew
 
1
2 ; 

 (+ g)
= 1
Solving for Ew and using (39) we nally nd
gS =
2L( 12 ; )  
 
   ( 12 ; )


(41)
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which looks very similar to (12): the only di¤erence is that now ; the
expenditure shares for the M  good, is not constant but it may di¤er across
regions and it is a positive function of the freeness of trade by (30) and (31).
This gives us
@gS
@
=
@
@
1

(2L+ ) > 0
and enables us to conclude that when the elasticity of substitution is larger
than 1; the rate of growth of innovation is positively inuenced by the process
of economic integration. Thus integration has a growth e¤ect. Why is this so?
A higher  means a larger expenditure share for M - goods in both regions.
This increase leads to higher prots which means, ceteris paribus, that there is
a larger incentive for manufacturing rms to invest in R&D. We should stress
that this growth-e¤ect of integration is not present in the typical NEGG model.
As for the CP equilibrium, we make use of the condition according to which
q = 0 and q = 1: In particular
q =

(+ g)
= [sE(1; ) + (1  sE)(1; )] E
w
 (+ g)
= 1
Since E = L when sK = sn = 1 we nd
E =
 (+ g)  L(1; )
(1; )
Using (35) with sn = 1; we also have
E =
(L  g) + L(1; )
   (1; )
by equating these two expressions we nally get
gcp =
L [(1; ) + (1; )]   (   (1; ))

6= gS
This expression conrms that integration is good for growth

@gcp
@ > 0

and
sheds light on the fact that geography matters for growth even when spillovers
are global. Indeed we can observe that
gcp > (<) gS : L

(1; ) + (1; )  2

1
2
; 

> (<) 



1
2
; 

  (1; )

The right member is surely negative, being 
 
1
2 ; 

< (1; ): So that a suf-
cient (but not necessary) condition for agglomeration to be growth-enhancing
is that the sum of the expenditures shares for the M -goods in the two regions
is larger in the CP than in the symmetric equilibrium.
(1; ) + (1; ) > 2

1
2
; 

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This condition may or may not hold according to the values of the parameters
;  and  but, in any case, a change in the geographical allocation of industries
will a¤ect the rate of growth of innovation through its e¤ect on the expenditure
shares and hence on prots. In particular, there is surely a subset of parameter
values such agglomeration is detrimental to growth in both countries.
3.4 Full specialization and uneven growth
In this section we will try to give an idea of why the conclusion according to
which long-run real income growth rates are identical across countries is far
from robust. The reason for the absence of long-run growth di¤erentials in
the typical NEGG model is to be found in the continual terms-of-trade gains.
Thanks to technological progress in the industrial sector, the price index of
manufactured goods decreases faster than that of the agricultural goods. This
implies that the relative value of the commodity in which the periphery special-
izes agricultural goods  increases overtime making the peripherys imports
of manufacturing goods cheaper. This positive e¤ect on the peripherys perma-
nent income perfectly o¤sets the negative e¤ect of slower productivity growth
in the traditional sector. As already stated, this result strongly suggests policy
rules that favour agglomeration of industrial activities since, in any case, the
periphery would not su¤er from any dynamic loss associated to the loss of the
industrial sector. But is this always the case? What assumptions are needed in
order to obtain this important result? And is the result robust to slight changes
in this assumption?
One way to answer these questions can be found in a simple model of en-
dogenous growth and trade contained in Lucas (1988). The economy considered
by Lucas consists of two goods (a high-tech and a low-tech good, just like in
NEGG models) and a continuum of trading countries. Consumers of each coun-
try choose how to allocate their income between the two goods according to a
CES utility function. In a simple framework with zero transport costs, homo-
geneous goods and no capital accumulation (pure learning-by-doing growth),
Lucas shows that: 1) countries specialize in the production of the good in which
they have a (dynamic) comparative advantage; 2) long-run growth rate of real
income di¤ers across countries whenever the elasticity of substitution between
high and low-tech goods is non-unitary. In particular, when the elasticity of
substitution is greater than 1 (which is considered by Lucas the most interest-
ing case) countries producing (having a comparative advantage in) high-learning
goods, will experience a higher-than-average real growth.
The mechanism behind this important result relies on the fact that, when
goods are good substitutes, the terms of trade e¤ects (the ever-increasing rela-
tive value of the low-tech good that makes the high-tech good relatively cheaper
for the low-tech countries) is dominated by the direct e¤ect of productivity. In
other words, low-tech countries experience a lower growth because the relative
value of low-tech goods does not increase as fast as would be necessary to com-
pensate for their slower relative productivity rate of growth.
What happens to long-run growth gap between countries in a typical NEGG
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model if we allow, as in Lucas (1988), the elasticity of substitution between
traditional and manufacturing goods to be larger than 1? The relevance of this
question appears to be very important for policymakers because, if Lucasresults
can be replicated in a NEGG model, then policies that favours agglomeration
may give rise to ever-increasing regional inequalities.
We shall now analyse problem posed by the introduction of such a general-
ization in a NEGG model and we will show that, with  > 0 and love for variety
(v > 0), the two countries do not generally grow at the same rate in real terms.
It is worth stressing that this result does not depend on full specialization per
se. This is shown by Bellone and Maupertuis (2003) who, allowing for complete
specialization in a typical NEGG model, and therefore for unequal wages be-
tween countries (as in Grossman-Helpman 1991), obtain that the "industrial"
country may enjoy a higher level of real income with respect to the "agricul-
tural" country but, since wages are constant in equilibrium, the two countries
grow at the same rate in real terms. Being the expenditure shares are constant
because of CD preferences and thanks to "love for variety" which constantly
lowers the perceived index price for manufactures, the "agricultural" country is
still able to enjoy a constant increase in the relative price of the good it produces
which is exactly equal to the loss in the relative productivity given by the fact
that only the industrial sector (and therefore the industrial country) benets
from technological progress.
3.4.1 Real growth and love for variety
Before analysing whether or not there is a case in which agglomeration gener-
ates ever increasing inequalities, let us investigate the relationship between real
growth (the rate of growth of real income and/or consumption) and love for
variety (measured by the parameter v).
We rst notice that the case we have considered so far, v = 0 and  
0; is associated to a situation of real growth equal to zero in both countries
regardless of the geographical allocation of industries and the degree of economic
integration. Let us see how this result is reached. First of all we can notice that,
in equilibrium, both expenditures and nominal income are constant in both
regions. As for expenditure we simply refer to (35) which tells us that world
expenditure is constant in steady state since it is a function of variables (sn; sE ; L
and g) which are all constant in steady state. And since sE must be constant
too, also E and E do not change along the balance growth path either. As for
nominal income, we can note that
Y = L+

sE
sn + (1  sn)(sn; ) +
(1  sE)
sn + (1  sn)
(sn; )

Ew

(42)
Y  = L+

sE
sn + (1  sn)(sn; ) +
(1  sE)
sn + (1  sn)
(sn; )

Ew

(43)
These expressions tell us, again, that Y and Y  are also constant in steady state.
But in order to calculate the real growth rate we need an expression for the
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perfect price index associated to the CES utility function (23). This is given14
for the two regions, by
P =

P

 1
M 
1
1 nw
1
1  ( 1  )
+ (1  ) 11 
 1

P  =

P
  1
M 
1
1 nw
1
1  ( 1  )
+ (1  ) 11 
 1

Since
_PM
PM
=
_PM
PM
=   g 1 and _n
w
nw = g in steady state, we can easily conclude
that, with v = 0;
_P
P
=
_P 
P 
= 0
and, therefore,
_Y
Y
 
_P
P
=
_Y 
Y 
 
_P 
P 
= 0
If we maintain the assumption of v = 0 (indi¤erence for variety), it is worth
noting that this result also holds when we use a CD second-stage utility function
which is a particular case of the CES utility function we have used so far in this
section15 . A certain degree of love for variety is then a necessary condition in
order to have real growth. However, as we have seen before, a positive degree of
love for variety (v > 0) associated to CES utility with  > 0 leads to a situation
in which the expenditure shares for manufactures are a positive function of the
world stock of capital. We shall look now at the consequences and the analytical
di¢ culties associated to this feature.
3.4.2 Agglomeration and uneven growth.
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on a framework in which capital is im-
mobile (we are interested in "catastrophic" agglomeration) and spillovers are
global. With CES utility and strictly positive v, the assumption stating that
a single countrys labour endowment will always be insu¢ cient to meet global
demand cannot be maintained. When preferences are represented by (23) this
assumption requires that
L < ([1  (sn; ; nw)] sE + [1  (sn; ; nw)] (1  sE))Ew (nw; sn; sE) (44)
where
Ew(sE ; sn; n
w; ) =
(2L  LI   LI)
sE (   (nw; sn; )) + (1  sE) (   (nw; sn; )) (45)
14This expression is obtained by solving the static problem of minimizing nominal expen-
ditures given a certain level of utility.
15With CD utility function and v = 0, the perfect price index becomes
P = PMn
w 
1 
so that _P = _P  = 0:
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It is not easy to say what happens to the right-hand member of (44) in
the long run as Kw; and therefore even nw; grows. Our aim is not to provide
a full analysis of the transitional dynamics of the model, but we can try to
present the intuition as follows. Suppose we start from a symmetric equilibrium
where w = w = 1 and sn = 1=2 and (44) holds. For low enough values
of transport costs, this equilibrium becomes also unstable (even more so) in
the CES case with  > 0, that is, any positive shock on sn brings about a
cumulative advantage to the north, reinforcing the innovation protability. In
the meantime,  will surely grow because both sn and nw are growing. As for
, we have a positive e¤ect given by the growth in nw but also a negative e¤ect
given by the growth of sn which makesM  goods more expensive for the south.
Moreover, as is clear from (45), world expenditure increases with nw; so that the
dynamic behaviour of the global demand for traditional products becomes very
complex. A necessary condition for the traditional good to be produced in only
one country is that global demand for traditional good is never higher than L
which represents the production capacity of a single country. Since Ew is upper-
bounded16 , the right member of (44) will surely reach the value L in a nite time.
So there certainly comes a time in which, thanks to the continuously decreasing
price of the M  goods, the global demand for the traditional goods becomes so
small that a single countrys labor endowment is su¢ cient to completely satisfy
it. Then, when  > 0 and v > 0; the traditional good will sooner or later be
produced by a single country.
But since agglomeration (sn = 1) occurs only asimptotically, the production
of the T  goods will be placed in only one region before the agglomeration
process has ended. The theory of comparative advantage suggest us that, at
that time, the country which will produce the traditional good will be the one
having a comparative advantage on it, that is, the one who is gradually losing its
industrial sector and thus has a comparative disadvantage in the production of
theM  good (say the south). What is the e¤ect of such an event in the ongoing
agglomeration process? Since wages will rise in the north, the agglomeration
process will not be reversed if and only if investment in the R&D andM - sector
remains unprotable for the south despite its wage-cost advantage17 .
It is then clear that CES preferences open the door to a number of very in-
teresting and complex dynamics which were precluded in the CD case. At this
time, we just aim at pointing out that, if an equilibrium of complete special-
ization exists and can be reached (i.e.: it is stable, as in Lucas (1988)), then it
is charachterized by a positive real growth gap between the North and the South
and therefore leads to increasing inequalities between them.
The most important consequence of full specialization is that, as in Bellone
and Maupertuis (2003) when the traditional sector disappears in the North,
16When capital grows overtime at the constant rate g; we have that
lim
t!1E
w (sE ; sn; n
w; ) =
(2L  g)
   1
17Obviously, this requirement is more easily satised when spillovers are localized. See
Bellone and Maupertuis (2003)
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northern wages are no longer linked to the price of the traditional good. We then
have to take into account the variable w; that is, northern wage18 . This implies,
by (8), that each varietys price is now equal to w: Hence, when sK = sn = 1;
the price index for the M goods becomes
PM =
"Z K+K
i=0
p1 i di
# 1
1 
= wnw
1
1  (46)
P M =
"Z K+K
i=0
p1 i di
# 1
1 
= w (nw)
1
1  (47)
As a consequence, even north and south expenditures shares for manufac-
tures depend now on w
(nw; 1; ; w) =
1
1 + (nw)
  v1  w

1 
 
1 

 1
1 
(48)
(nw; 1; ; w) =
1
1 + (nw)
  v1  w

1 

(1 )(1 )
 
1 

 1
1 
(49)
which means that their growth rate is the following
_

=

1  

v
_nw
nw
  _w
w

(1  ) (50)
_

=

1  

v
_nw
nw
  _w
w

(1  ) (51)
Hence expenditure shares are constant if and only if _ww = v
_nw
nw :We can show
that this is impossible when _n
w
nw is a positive constant. Let us start by taking
into account three relevant market-clearing conditions.
Firstly, the world labour market has to clear all the time. In general, we
must have that 2L = (LT + LT ) + (LM + L

M ) + (LI + L

I) : But, with full
specialization
LT = L
LT = L

M = L

I = 0
LI =
_nw
nw
so that
L = LM +
_nw
nw
(52)
Secondly, as theM  goods market has to clear, the value of total production
(which when sK = 1 corrensponds to the value of north production) must be
18Notice that wI = wM = w since workers are mobile across sectors within the same regions.
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equal to total expenditure. Since with complete agglomeration we have E = L;
then
wLM

   1 = E+ L
 (53)
Finally, the traditional goods market has to clear too and therefore the
value of total production (which in full specialization corresponds to the souths
production) must be equal to total expenditures for the T goods
E (1  ) + L (1  ) = L (54)
Notice that this last condition is very similar to the no-full-specialization
condition (7). Once we have introduced the new variable w; this condition can
(and has to!) hold with equality: south production of T  good must be equal
to global demand for T - goods. Using (52), (53) and (54) we nd that
E =
w
 
L  _nwnw

   1 (55)
This expression tells us that, in complete specialization, northern expen-
diture E and northern wage rate w must grow at the same rate in order to
constantly clear the market.
By (54) we obtain
E
1  

= L
so that, di¤erentiating with respect to time, we have
_E
E
  _
1    
_

= 0 (56)
Substituting for (50) and (51) and since _EE =
_w
w ; we have that
_w
w
=
+  (  )
1 +  (  ) v
_nw
nw
< v
_nw
nw
In other words, northern wages have to grow in order to constantly maintain
the market-clearing conditions but their growth cannot be large enough to o¤set
the positive e¤ect on prices of the growth of nw: Hence both  and  increase
and approach the unit value for t!1: This is a considerable problem because
it means that the balanced growth path can only be reached asimptotically.
But even without formalizing the transitional dynamics, we can conclude that
during this transition the two countries do not share the same real growth rate.
First, we know that prices will decrease faster in the north. Indeed, we have
_P
P
=
w

 1 
1
1 nw
v
1 
w

 1 
1
1 nw
v
1  + (1  ) 11 

_w
w
  v _n
w
nw

_P 
P 
=
w

 1
1
1 

 1 
1
1 nw
v
1 
w

 1
1
1 

 1 
1
1 nw
v
1  + (1  ) 11 

_w
w
  v _n
w
nw

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so that _PP <
_P
P : Second, we know that southern expenditure remains xed
at level L; which corrensponds to the value of production of the traditional
good. Third, since both  and  increase over-time, by (56) we also see that
northern expenditure E increases. We can therefore conclude that
_E
E
 
_P
P
>
_E
E
 
_P 
P 
=  
_P 
P 
so that, unlike in the CD case, real consumption growth is higher in the core
than in the periphery. In a similar way, we can show that there is a positive
gap between north and south real income growth.
Summing up, we have argued that the result indicating that real growth
rates will be the same in both countries regardless of the geographical allocation
of industries is a very particular case and its not robust to slight changes in
the assumption of the model. In particular, when the elasticity of substitution
between the two kinds of goods may assume any value between 1 and 1; it
might well be that the core grow faster than the periphery in real terms. This
result seems to have important consequences for policymakers since, in this
case, policies that favour agglomeration may generate ever-increasing regional
inequalities. This more pessimistic viewpoint on the e¤ects of agglomeration
on core-periphery patterns is indirectly supported by the empirical evidence
showing that the expenditure share in the agricultural good is decreasing as real
income increases a phenomenon compatible with an elasticity of substitution
greater than one.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have dealt with the issue of the relationship between the
agglomeration of economic activities and economic growth. In the rst part
we have surveyed the main results of a typical "New Economic Geography and
Growth" (NEGG) model and we have seen how these results might be helplful
in drawing up regional policy rules which favour the concentration of activities
in only one region. In the second part of the paper we challenged this optimistic
vision of the consequences of agglomeration and we showed how these results are
crucially based on very restrictive values of some parameters of the model and
how they are sensitive to slight changes in these values. In particular we have
provided some analytical examples in which, according to di¤erent values of the
degree of love for variety and of the elasticity of substitution between traditional
and manufacturing goods, it is evident that a) when trade is costly enough the
symmetric equilibrium might not be stable even when capital is perfectly mobile;
b) the rate of growth might depend on the geographical allocation of industries
even when spillovers are global; and, c) when industrial rms are concentrated
in only one region, countries might not grow at the same rate in real terms.
The main message of our analysis is that policymakers should be aware of the
fact that implementing regional policy rules suggested by NEGG models might
actually harm the periphery. In other words, the e¤ect of agglomeration might
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be di¤erent (and indeed more dangerous) than what commonly thought so far.
This message is all the more relevant if we consider that we have only focused
on some particular aspects of NEGG models while there are other issues which
deserves closer scrutiny. For example, what happens if we allow for intersectoral
spillovers between the traditional and the manufacturing sector? This appears
to be an important shortfall of NEGG models since our common sense suggest
that knowledge might ow not only across space but even across di¤erent sectors.
If we introduce some kind of intersectoral spillovers by allowing for technological
progress even in the traditional sector, which benets from the proximity of the
domestic R&D or/and the manufacturing sector only, then agglomeration might
be even more dangerous for the periphery since it would remove an important
engine of growth. This result would be compatible with some empirical evidence
according to which the traditional sector is more productive in "industrial"
countries. On the other hand, whenever we allow for technology to ow across
regions with di¤erent specializations (in accordance with the evidence reported
by Di Liberto, Mura and Pigliaru (2004)), then the negative growth impact of
agglomeration discussed in Section 3.4 might well be mitigated. An intuition
for that is provided by Murat and Pigliaru (1998) which generalize Lucas (1988)
by introducing intersectoral and international spillovers: in such an analytical
context, uneven growth is always ruled out and the only kind of damage for the
periphery (i.e. the "agricultural" country) is a static one. But detailed analysis
of the impact of intersectoral spillovers in NEGG models (which appears to be
strongly needed) is left for future research.
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